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NSPM IN ENGLISH

NSPM IN ENGLISH - Serbia, Democracy and the issue of Kosovo and Metohija

 

 

Vojin Joksimovich

PART II: 2008 KOSOVO SECESSION 

Troika Report: Overview and Analysis

The EU/U.S./Russia troika report was submitted to the UN Secretary General ahead of the December 10 schedule. Even I had an access to the report on December 8. The report contains no more than 20 pages. The summary contains only two paragraphs. The first one asserts that the negotiations were conducted within the framework of UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the “Guiding Principles” of the Contact Group. “The parties discussed a wide range of options, such as full independence, supervised independence, territorial partition, substantial autonomy, confederal arrangements even a status silent agreement to disagree.”

The second paragraph reads: “The Troika was able to facilitate high-level, intense and substantive discussions between Belgrade and Pristina. Nonetheless, the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the final status of Kosovo. Neither party was willing to cede its position on the fundamental question of sovereignty over Kosovo. This is regrettable, as a negotiated settlement is in the best interests of both parties.”

Nine annexes are divided in two parts: A) Background Documents; 1) UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999); and 2) “Guiding Principles” of the Contact Group (November 2005); B) Troika Documents: 3) UN Secretary-General's statement on the period of engagement on Kosovo (August 1, 2007); 4) Troika Events; 5) Statement on Kosovo by Contact Group Ministers (September 27, 2007); 6) Vienna Non-paper (August 30, 2007); 7) New York Declaration (September 28, 2007); 8) Troika Assessment of Negotiations: Principal Conclusions; 9) Troika-Communiqué (Baden, November 28, 2007).

All in all, there is not much in this report. The report fails to recognize that Serbia has compromised by granting the most far-reaching autonomy to Kosovo Albanians short of outright independence. It is the Albanian intransigence, with the U.S. support, which rendered negotiations all but worthless. Beyond this, a question that comes to mind is whether the whole process was a negotiating farce despite the fact that the troika held 10 major sessions with the Serbian and Albanian delegations? The author sides with the remarks made by the Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov when it comes to the allocation of blame for the failure of negotiations. The second place in the blame equation goes definitely to Germany and Ischinger as their representative who allowed the EU to be humiliated in the process. The Serbian delegation performed admirably. The outcome is obviously disheartening to them.

When diplomacy fails, it means war. Given its influence on Kosovo Albanians, the U.S. holds the key for stability in the Balkans. It appears that the U.S. is confident that there will be no destabilization of the Balkans with likely consequences not only in the Balkans, but in Europe and even beyond. Presumably, this confidence comes from wielding decisive NATO military force in Kosovo which allows pursuit of this aggressive policy. Hence, together with its lapdog, the UK and possibly France, it seems to be determined to abandon the UN process as it continues to overemphasize the Albanian case for separatism while at the same time ignores the Serbian and Russian case for adherence to international law. It boils down to a simple equation: Russia backs diplomacy but the U.S. backs force. It amounts to reversal of roles during the Cold War. Srdja Trifkovic has ably coined the new term “Kremlin on the Potomac .” Mike Jackson, the former British Army chief who commanded the KFOR when it entered Kosovo in 1999, feels that the Kosovo situation is “a mess” that threatens to spill over into ethnic violence again.

With the U.S. and Russia at loggerheads the EU is now in pivotal position. At the EU end of the year summit, the EU has asserted its leadership by committing to send its 1,800 person strong civilian mission to replace UNMIK. A period of reflection is now badly needed to figure out exactly the course of action. The author takes a liberty of suggesting what both the EU and Belgrade should do in his best judgment.

Yet Another Negotiating Farce

In his regular Washington Post column Richard Holbrooke, the Democrat's perennial Secretary of State-designate, claims that the American diplomacy working closely with the German troika representative Ischinger has largely succeeded in persuading most of European allies to recognize Kosovo rapidly. He seems to be implying that the 120-day process was nothing more than a farce despite the fact that the troika process was definitely better conducted than the Ahtisaari process which perpetuated the perception of a rigged process stacked against Serbia . It certainly wouldn't be unprecedented. In French chateau near Paris, Rambouillet Conference February/March 1999, the Clinton administration orchestrated sham negotiations. It was a setup for war rather than a Peace Conference. Post-Baden statements made by Albanian leaders corroborate the farce assertion. Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu said: “Even the last 120 days of talks were unnecessary.” Veton Surroi said: “Kosovo can't remain hostage to procedures. We have fulfilled our obligations. Now it is our partner's turn.” Obligations of the Albanian negotiators were simply to run out the clock.

Lavrov Accuses Western Countries 

Russia 's foreign minister Sergei Lavrov accused Western countries of fueling a drive for independence by neglecting Pristina violations of UN resolutions. “The conniving indifference of our Western partners toward violations [of UN resolution #1244] by Kosovo Albanians and their attempts to avoid proper actions to enforce the full implementation of this resolution, have inspired a psychological drive toward Kosovo independence.” Furthermore Lavrov accused the Kosovo leaders of using pure blackmail to justify plans for independence. “Our Western partners are succumbing to this blackmail and are starting to say that if we don't give Kosovo independence, it will cause an outbreak of violence. To threaten us with violence and disorder if we refuse to make certain decisions is a dangerous and slippery path, which may have repercussions far away from Kosovo. If the West recognizes Kosovo as an independent state, Russia will act in accordance with International law.”

Ischinger Doomed Negotiations

Ischinger performance doomed the negotiating process. His statement that “we left no stone unturned” was disingenuous. The Albanian position of independence or nothing has gone unchallenged. There was yet another disingenuous statement: “If they get 50% of their demands, it is better than no solution at all.” Instead of challenging the Albanian maximalist approach he attempted to trick the Serbs into a 1972 agreement aimed at strengthening neighborly relations between West and East Germany . This was immediately dismissed by both sides. Then he came up with proposal of “neutral status,” that “would normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo, without containing the word on status.” This approach would de facto recognize Kosovo as an independent state. Needless to say, both proposals were in contravention of the UN Charter and UN #1244. He showed no interest in the Hong Kong or Aland Islands models. His approach boiled down to helping Western independence advocates to say that they had wanted a different development and did everything possible to achieve it, but things are the way they are and it is now time to rapidly recognize the reality: an independent Kosovo. As a result of his tactics, the EU is now saddled with a severe test.

The EU has now to contend with the consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence by failing to distance itself from the U.S. 'unequivocal approach. In addition, very few mention that the EU taxpayers would have to foot the bill for another failed state founded on organized crime in which the justice system is loaded with 40,000 incomplete criminal cases and in which corruption-crime investigations are virtually non-existent. According to the Transparency International, an anti-corruption watchdog based in Berlin , Kosovo under the KLA leadership is among the most corrupt regions in the world today, the fourth in the world right after Cameron , Cambodia and Albania . Sixty seven percent of Kosovo residents have stated they have to pay bribes to get services. Does this criminal governance meet any criteria for a legal secession?

Disheartening for Serbian Delegation

The Serbian negotiators have done an excellent job by exhibiting necessary flexibility and creativity. Belgrade was ready to sacrifice everything, or almost everything, in order to keep Kosovo within Serbia . In the last few months, it has been making one concession after another. It presented in detail the Serbian proposal for unprecedented Kosovo autonomy, to be frozen for 20 years, including most competencies and symbols of a sovereign state: access to financial international institutions like the IMF, trade and cultural representative offices abroad, own flag, anthem and national sport teams. Relations with Serbia would be normalized. Benefits of joining the EU would be enjoyed by Kosovo. Serbia would reserve the right to exclusive representation in the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe. Serbia would also “maintain the right to associate with the provinces' foreign policy, defense, border control and the protection of Serbian heritage.” Serbian proposals using models of functioning autonomies of Hong Kong, Aland Islands and South Tyrol demonstrated initiatives badly lacking on the other side. The Hong Kong model was presumably used to get China even more involved. It has some shortcomings: the Hong Kong Chinese voted for reintegration into China . Aland Islands is, however, an excellent example. It is an archipelago of more than 6,000 islands in the Baltic Sea, about half way between Sweden and Finland . Its population of 27,000 speaks Swedish. In 1917, 96.2% of its residents voted to join Sweden . Their bid was, however, blocked in 1921 by the League of Nations, which decided that they should remain part of Finland. It is an autonomous, demilitarized, monolingual Swedish speaking administrative province of Finland.

U.S. Determines Stability in Balkans

Serbian President Tadic thinks Washington has not managed to understand the complex international situation in the Balkans—just as it did not understand in Iraq . There is more to it. The U.S. policies in the Balkans have been enigmatic as addressed in part III of this essay. However, there is little doubt that the U.S' final position on Kosovo is crucial regarding stability and peace in the Balkans as the Albanians are under full control of the U.S. Simply speaking, adherence to the UN #1244 means stability and bypassing the international law means most likely long-term instability. Thomas Fleiner, a Swiss legal adviser to the Serbian government, firmly maintains: “The text of the resolution is quite clear to any lawyer and it calls for respect of sovereignty and search for a solution for Kosovo only within the essential autonomy framework,” and as such “every decision that would step out of that framework will require consensus of both sides and an amendment to resolution 1244.” The U.S. , UK and France had voted together with Russia and China for the UN #1244. Fleiner further asserts that the unilateral declaration would be equal to “the declaration of war and a hostile act against the United Nations.”

U.S. / UK Abandoning UNSC Process?

After the troika report the ball has been kicked into the UN court. Russia said that it will demand that the UNSC annul any unilateral declaration of independence as it would be a violation of UN #1244 and introduced key elements for a draft statement calling for a “continued negotiating process between Pristina and Belgrade in order to reach agreement on Kosovo's future status.” As expected, the U.S. and UK ambassadors rejected the appeal saying that the negotiating process has been exhausted after a two-year effort failed. British ambassador John Sauers stated: “I don't believe the Security Council, as far as I can judge, is going to be able to reach agreement on a way forward, in which case other organizations will have to take their responsibilities, namely the European Union and NATO.”

Condoleezza Rice, who has already qualified for a street to be named after her in Pristina, made statements that Russia must accept reality that “Serbia and Kosovo are never going to be one again...if you don't deal with that reality, you are to sow the seeds of considerable discontent and considerable instability;” plus focus is now on ensuring that Kosovo fulfills its obligations under the Ahtisaari plan—such as protection of minority rights and religious sites—because there isn't any more point to further negotiation.” These are clear indications that a stalemate has been reached and that the U.S. is abandoning the UN process in favor of using organizations like the EU and NATO to impose Ahtisaari plan on Serbia.

The real hawk within the Bush administration is of course Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns; a holdover from the Clinton administration schooled in the policy of raping Serbia in order to appease radical Islam in the Balkans. He seems to be beyond redemption. Of course, the White House if they want to could make Burns shut up in the interest of the U.S. global policies, which shouldn't result in the Cold War II with Russia . He has not been serving his country well and should perhaps consider resigning.

It appears that not much can be expected from the December 19 UNSC meeting with exception of a debate to replace UNMIK with the EU mission. The EU leaders agreed in “principle” to send an EU mission of some 1,800 police and judiciary officials and pledged the EU would play a leading role in Kosovo. Serbia has, however, sent a clear message that the EU mission is not welcome unless a compromise is reached within the UNSC. Not only the EU big four (Germany, France, Italy and Britain) but even the Greek foreign minister Dora Bakoyannis think that the UN # 1244 allows the EU mission to replace UNMIK. Russia should insist on the vote after the debate on further negotiations and let the U.S. or UK or France , or all of them, cast a veto in order to detach Kosovo forcefully from Serbia . UN Secretary General Ki-Moon is due to give his position on Kosovo in January.

EU in Pivotal Position

With the U.S. and Russia at loggerheads, the EU is put into the pivotal position. For the EU, Kosovo independence is a hot potato. If the EU would respect its own system of deciding by consensus, the 27 EU members are supposed to reach unanimity. One member has power to veto a decision of majority. An example being Cyprus veto for closer defense ties between the EU and Turkey . Cyprus , vehemently opposed to the independence given its own problems with the Turkish-control north of the divided island, seems to be willing to play the veto role. There is a second tier of EU countries which have serious reservations, especially if independence is declared unilaterally, fearing it would encourage separatist movements in their countries and elsewhere: Spain , Slovakia , Rumania and Greece . There is a third tier of countries, like Hungary and the Czech Republic , who would like to see the EU unity which would require much effort and consultations. They also pointed out that the international community should pay as much attention to Serbia as to Kosovo.

EU Summit

Traditional end-of-the-year EU summit took place on December 14. It started at 10 am and ended after lunch. There was a lot of publicity how they are going to forge unity on how to handle Kosovo's bid for independence without inciting new violence. Memories of the 1990s apparently still haunt EU capitals. However, the EU remained divided how to recognize Kosovo's independence thus putting at risk an administrative takeover from the UN, a mission that requires unanimity. The mission was agreed upon in “principle” whatever that means suggesting there was unanimity on that issue. Gordon Brown, the British PM, even said that the “legal basis” had been established and that it would be implemented in February following the next meeting of foreign ministers. The Guardian used the term “the biggest foreign policy gamble,” and suggested “the EU was responding to strong pressure from Washington , which has signaled that it will wait until February before recognizing an independent Kosovo, but no longer.” The mantra that further negotiations have been exhausted prevailed.

On two key issues the EU continued to be divided—on recognizing an independent Kosovo and on accelerated track for Serbia's negotiations for the EU membership. The Romanian Prime Minister says “there is a broad interest to sustain a common European position. But there is one problem where we have a clear position. We won't recognize an independent Kosovo because of the impact of the stability of the region.” Apparently this represented a U-turn for the PM because he can't get backing in the parliament. How many more parliaments will have a say? Instead of unity on independence the summit discussed over lunch a paper drafted by the Contact Group members minus Russia on how the EU could recognize Kosovo after it declares independence. Under the plan the EU big four, i.e. Germany , France , Italy and Britain would recognize Kosovo days after declaration, followed by other EU nations. The U.S. and others would follow suit after that.

They clashed also over whether to grant Serbia a fast-track membership deal as a means of persuading Serbia to relax its opposition to Kosovo independence. Italy and the Czech Republic argued in favor but the EU executive, the EC Commission, backed up by Netherlands and the Nordic countries, insisted that signing the SAA should be conditional on Serbia 's full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. According the AP, Sarkozy said the EU “must send a positive signal to Serbia ,” but Serbia could only join the bloc “if it satisfies all conditions; if it respects the independence of Kosovo.” To the best of my knowledge this is the first time that Serbia 's membership was linked with Serbia giving up Kosovo. The Slovak PM Robert Fico said that the integration of Serbia into EU cannot be linked with the issue of Kosovo. Dora Bakoyannis expressed strong opposition to any attempt to link Kosovo with Serbia 's EU prospects.

Period of Reflection

In the circumstances, the EU would be wise to follow what Dora Bakoyannis stated. Greece will continue to follow a responsible policy without hurried moves and decisions. “A criterion of our decisions will be the safeguarding of stability and peace and the broader Greek interests in the region. In every case, Serbia 's European course and of the broader region of the western Balkans must proceed with stable, concrete steps.” Furthermore, “there is no good or easy solution for Kosovo and no one has proposed to date. There must be a period of reflection, so that Belgrade and Pristina evaluate new facts.”

Reflecting the notion of period of reflection the EU enlargement chief, Olli Rehn, stated: “Kosovo's final solution will be postponed to early spring. A solution must be found. The current situation is not sustainable.” EU foreign ministers are due to hold a key meeting in Slovenia on March 28-29. This schedule takes into account timing of the Serbian presidential elections, which will determine whether Boris Tadic, perceived as pro-European liberal reformer, is re-elected. Run-off is scheduled for February 3.

The EU must resist the U.S. pressure for a speedy “solution” of a problem as complex as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which has been in existence for 50 years. The EU should use this period of reflection to carefully study a Kosovo solution including lessons learned from the dismemberment of Yugoslavia . Otherwise, the EU will lose Serbia as a prospective member, a country which is deemed by many to be a key country in the Western Balkans. A European Commission representative recently stated that Serbia has a chance to be a leader in the field of economy and that it has greater potential than Croatia. All in all, the EU should behave as an adult rather than as an American dependent. It behaved as an adult, although only partly, in case of Iraq and should fully learn from the Balkan calamities in the 1990s.

Lessons Learned from Yugoslav Tragedy

As the European Security Strategy concluded in 2003, the credibility of the EU's foreign policy “depends on the consolidation of our achievements” in the Balkans. In order to prevent further losses of credibility, Europe must clearly define the core of its fledgling Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). After its failure to cope with disintegration of Yugoslavia , the CPSP is once again challenged by the existing Kosovo crisis. The EU (then EC) badly mishandled disintegration of Yugoslavia and even allowed Germany to dismember Yugoslavia by recognizing unilateral declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia (incidentally despite U.S. condemnation) using arbitrary internal borders between the Yugoslav republics as international borders. These reckless moves led to bloody civil wars in Croatia and subsequently in Bosnia. The EC's arbiters ruled that Croatia did not meet standards for recognition. Nonetheless, the German foreign minister said: “Our recognition of Croatia and Slovenia is unconditional.”

The Kosovo case comprises the same two elements that led to the Yugoslav civil wars: unilateral declaration of independence and internal borders. In the case of Kosovo the U.S. plays the reckless role Germany played in dismembering Yugoslavia. What standards for recognition has Kosovo met? As discussed in Part I Kosovo is a dysfunctional society that is anything but ready for independence. Besides, as pointed out by Pierre Marti “the Albanian minority of Serbia is not sovereign people. It is an irredentist diaspora of Republic of Albania .” The Albanian minorities exist in Macedonia, Greece and Montenegro. Should Europe have eventually five Albania 's? By the same logic there should be five Hungary 's as the Hungarians live in Rumania, Slovakia, Serbia and Croatia in addition to Hungary itself.

Historically Kosovo, as Kosovo and Metohija (Kosmet), did not become an entity until 1945, when the Yugoslav communists divided the country into six republics and two autonomous regions. What is now called Kosmet was first called the Autonomous Kosovo and Metohija Region (AKMO in Serbian). The northern boundary was the city limit of Kosovska Mitrovica. In 1959, an administrative decision was made to rearrange internal Serbia 's boundaries (not borders) so to attach three southernmost municipalities, Leposavic, Lesak and Socanica of the Central Serbia to become AKMO northernmost municipalities. They included 71 Serbian villages and a single Albanian village. Since 1999, the Serbian government has been setting up parallel institutions and picking up bills for healthcare, education and public administration.

What Should EU Do

Reintegration of this northern part into Serbia should be recognized by the EU as a very first step in a search for the Kosovo solution in order to avoid a double secession scenario in case the Albanian secession does take place. This would avoid likely violence and ethnic cleansing. The outside borders should be inviolable unless changes are agreed upon by both sides. Discussions over independence must be replaced by discussions over broad autonomy and special relations with the EU. The lure of membership itself is insufficient to make nations ignore the issues of autonomy and self-determination. This is contrary to Ischinger's view that Serbia and Kosovo share the ultimate goal of accession to EU membership. Supporting Kosovo independence while insisting that both have a common European future is contradictory. Kosovo issue has a potential for the EU to assert itself as credible global power.

The Europeans are typically more pragmatic than Americans. This pragmatism will probably compel the EU to reach out to Russia . After all Kosovo is in Europe . Instability there would affect the EU and not the U.S. Xavier Solana, the EU foreign policy supremo, has recently stated that the EU cannot resolve the Kosovo issue without Russia and in addition advocated multilaterism in international relations. Russia is viewed not only as the most important neighbor but as a strategic partner in particular because of the energy dependency. Sarcozy might think that he might reach a satisfactory deal with Russia which wouldn't humiliate Serbia. Germany and Italy might also arrive at the conclusion that showdown with Putin must be avoided leaving Britain and several other American lapdogs in minority.

What Belgrade Should Do

The PM Kostunica has appropriately commented on the EU Summit conclusions “especially abusive and unacceptable” and promised to respond after the UNSC debate on December 19. Seventy five percent of the Serbian population indicated that they would rather forgo EU membership than give up Kosovo. A strong response on both the Serbian and Russian side is needed.

Many editorials speculate that likely Belgrade response to unilateral declaration would include economic measures such as cutting off power supplies, closure of border with Kosovo, travel restrictions, a trade embargo and legal challenges to privatization measures. Kosovo doesn't have much beyond a mafia economy. Hence, they could only hurt the life of ordinary citizens who now live on rationed electricity anyway.

Serbian President Boris Tadic has announced that Serbia will launch an initiative that the UNCS should seek from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) an opinion on whether the possible independence of Kosovo province would be legal or not. It would be up to Serbia to annul the unilateral decision and to launch international legal processes before appropriate institutions. Adviser Fleiner explained that the ICJ can be engaged in two ways - one is for a UN organ to seek an advisory opinion of that Court, and another is that the Court is asked to pass judgment in a conflict. In that event, Serbia would have to recognize the binding authority of the ICJ. Serbia is among the countries that have accepted the Statute of that Court, but not also its binding authority.

Former Serbian negotiator, Leon Kojen suggested that the Serbian Parliament should pass a resolution addressed to the EU pointing out that Serbia cannot sign the SAA unless the EU drops its support for the secession of Kosovo. The message is: Choose between Kosovo and Serbia , as Serbia cannot join an organization which wants to amputate 15% of its territory. This would cause a number of EU countries to reflect even further than what Dora Bakoyannis had in mind. It should convince some EU countries that Serbia means business and it is not going to trade Kosovo for a not so fast-track to the EU membership. The Serbian Parliament might also consider another resolution: to redefine the Kosovo internal boundary back to where it was in 1959.

The Serbian government must be prepared to send troops to protect the Kosovo Serbs and the religious treasures in case of replica of the March 2004 scenario in case KFOR cannot guarantee protection. It might consider even opening the dialogue with Russia to establish a Russian military base in proximity to Kosovo. Presence of the Russian navy in the Mediterranean may not be sufficient. In addition, the Serbian government should explore a number of partition scenarios. Ivor Roberts, former British ambassador to Yugoslavia , has advocated partition as the best answer in the column published by the Independent. The Daily Telegraph editorial as well as Ian Bancroft in the Guardian have also explored partition options. Lastly, the Serbian presidential elections scheduled for January 20 and February 3 must be postponed.

Other Countries

Retired Maj.-Gen. Lewis MacKenzie, commander of the UN Protection Force in Sarajevo in 1992 stated in an interview: "[ Canada should] take the side of the sovereignty of nations and say what [ Serbia ] is offering is generous to the extreme and should be accepted...If, all of a sudden, we honor a minority that, through violence, achieves its independence, [other groups] from northern Ireland, to Hungarians in Romania , and Hungarians in northeast Serbia [might also follow the violent path to sovereignty]."

This is a good piece of advice to be followed by other countries. At his writing Canada seems to be following Mackenzie's advice. By the way, The Serbian Minister for Kosovo and Metohija Slobodan Samardzic has stated that at least 30 countries oppose the Kosovo independence. These countries need to become more vocal. In 2005 there were only a handful of them. Kosovo issue goes beyond Europe to countries such as Iraq , Israel , Indonesia , China, India, South Africa and some other African countries.

Conclusion

It is difficult to believe that in the 21 st century the world's only superpower for the reasons to be discussed in Part III, with support from big EU four wants to carve up a sovereign country against its will. Serbia has demonstrated that it wants to join the European family of nations and has been developing a democratic future. There are many Kosovo's round the globe for which the U.S. and its NATO allies insist preservation of territorial integrity must be maintained. Nonetheless, they insist that creation of a second Albania in Europe on Serbian territory must take place. Their bulldozers are in high gear and unless smaller EU countries seriously challenge this abuse of power a precedent with far reaching consequences will be created. Russia and Serbia can still turn these bulldozers around depending on the moves they choose to make in early 2008. D day was supposed to be in 2006, then in 2007 and then on December 10. Kosovo PM Ceku, after hearing from Rice that she couldn't imagine Kosovo remaining part of Serbia, wanted to move it even to late November in order to overlap with the Albanian Flag Day. It has now been moved now to February/March and some are even talking about May. For a huge mess that has been unnecessarily created it's going to take a while for a cleanup to take place. Upon a serious scrutiny, the unprecedented autonomy Serbia has offered might look attractive. In 2008 there might be a secession followed by recognition of some Western and Islamic countries but there might not be. Stalemate might continue yet for a while. The outcome of secession is still uncertain. However, what is certain is that a truly independent state will not be created.

 

 

 

 
 
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